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3.1.20OFFICIAL STATEMENT BELOWDERIVED REQUIREMENTPENDING NIST SME REVIEW

3.1.20External system connections

3.1 Access Control · NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 · The heading label is this site's navigational shorthand; the official language is the statement below.

Official requirement statement (verbatim)

Verify and control/limit connections to and use of external systems.

NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 — Protecting CUI in Nonfederal SystemsNIST SP 800-171A — Assessing Security Requirements for CUI
Independent interpretation

What this requirement is after

External systems are systems you do not control — a partner's network, an employee's home computer, a cloud service outside your tenancy. Before your information or your users touch them, you verify what they are and set limits on the connection, instead of discovering the arrangement after the fact.

Mapped practices

Brilliant at the Basics practices that support this requirement

Partial implementation supportModerate confidence

Why: Third-party AI services are external systems, and the practice does to them exactly what this requirement asks: inventory what is in use, sanction specific services under known terms, and limit or block the rest.

What this does not claim: External systems reach far beyond AI — personal devices, partner networks, every unsanctioned cloud service — and the practice governs only the AI class, so the requirement's full inventory and verification work remains. Sanctioning a tool also requires verifying its handling terms (retention, training use, tenancy) against your obligations, which takes contract and configuration review the acceptable-use rule alone does not provide.

Practice-side activities
  • Inventory AI tools and embedded AI features already in use, including browser extensions
  • Sanction specific services under reviewed terms and block or restrict the remainder
  • Provide the sanctioned alternative so unsanctioned use has somewhere legitimate to go
Evidence this produces
  • The sanctioned AI service list with the terms review per service
  • Blocking or discovery reports for unsanctioned AI services

Review status: Technical review complete · Reviewed by inDirectIT practitioner review — CUI security and NIST SP 800-171 engineering · updated 2026-08-06

Doing the work

Implementation considerations and evidence

Implementation considerationsIndependent guidance — tailor to your environment
  • Inventory the external systems already in use — partner portals, personal devices, unsanctioned cloud services — before writing rules about hypothetical ones.
  • Set the terms per class: which external systems are approved for what, under what agreement, and enforce technically where you can — tenant restrictions, egress filtering, blocking unapproved services.
  • Give employees a sanctioned path for the legitimate need each unsanctioned service was meeting, or the inventory will just refill.
What operating evidence looks likeRecords worth retaining, not a submission checklist
  • The approved external system list with the terms and agreement per entry
  • Technical enforcement configuration limiting unapproved external connections
  • Records of unsanctioned services found and dispositioned

Suggested owners, derived from the mapped practices and artifacts: Engineering lead · IT leader or compliance lead · IT leader. Ownership is a named person in your organization, not a role on a website.

Artifacts

Templates and worksheets with a mapped relationship

The other revision

Where this lands in Rev. 3

Provenance

Sources and review status

Primary sourcesNIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 — Protecting CUI in Nonfederal Systems · NIST SP 800-171A — Assessing Security Requirements for CUI
Review statusPending NIST SME review
Content version1.0
Updated