30-Day Implementation Plan Template
Brilliant at the Basics Resource Center · brilliantatthebasics.us · published by inDirectIT, Inc.
Independent educational material. Not affiliated with, sponsored by, approved by, or endorsed by the U.S. Department of War. Does not establish compliance, certification, or contractual standing.
Purpose
A structured first month. The horizons and actions come from the practice guides; the owner, date, and evidence columns are yours to fill in.
How to use it
Pick no more than six practices for the first month — fewer if you have no dedicated IT staff. Assign a named owner to each, not a department. A row without an owner and a date is a wish.
Scope this plan
Plan header
| Organization | Plan owner | Start date | Review date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Practice in scope this month | Why it was chosen | Named owner | Target date |
|---|---|---|---|
Actions by horizon
Copy the rows for the practices you selected above. The reference list below is generated from the practice guides.
| Practice | 24-hour actions | 14-day actions | 30-day actions |
|---|---|---|---|
| IT-01 — Phishing-resistant MFA | List accounts with admin or remote access; Enable MFA for those accounts today | Enroll every administrator on a phishing-resistant method and stop accepting SMS as an admin factor; Write down and test the break-glass procedure before you tighten enforcement further | Enroll the remote workforce; Pilot FIDO2 keys or passkeys with one team |
| IT-02 — Asset inventory | Name an inventory owner; Pull existing lists from MDM, identity provider, and procurement | Merge the endpoint, identity, and procurement exports into one record and mark the rows that appear in only one source; Flag every device with no owner and every account with no matching employee | Merge the sources into one record; Flag devices with no owner or no management agent |
| OT-01 — OT identity and access control | Find default and vendor-set passwords on reachable devices; List every shared/generic login in use | Change the default and vendor-set passwords you can safely change in the next approved maintenance window; Confirm break-glass access exists, is documented, and has been tested against an identity or network outage | Change safe-to-change default credentials in a maintenance window; Confirm break-glass access exists and is tested |
| OT-02 — Validated OT asset inventory | Name an inventory owner; Collect existing vendor and project asset lists | Walk down one production line and record make, model, firmware, connectivity, and criticality with the operators; Reconcile that line against the vendor and project documentation and investigate anything that appears in only one | Walk down one production line; Record make, model, firmware, and connectivity |
| IT-05 — Logical segmentation | Identify your most sensitive systems and where CUI lives; Confirm management interfaces are off the user network | Confirm management interfaces are unreachable from the standard user network and fix any that are; Move high-risk devices — legacy systems, IoT, guest Wi-Fi — off the general user segment | Define zones by function and trust level; Isolate high-risk devices (legacy, IoT, guest) onto their own segments |
| OT-03 — OT network segmentation | Map every connection between the business and OT networks; Flag any direct, unfiltered IT-to-OT paths | Map every connection between the business and OT networks, including forgotten links, cellular modems, and vendor tunnels; Close or broker the riskiest direct path in an approved window, with a tested rollback | Define OT zones and the boundary architecture with the process owner; Close or broker the riskiest direct connections in a window |
| OT-06 — OT remote access pathways | Inventory every remote and vendor access path into OT; Disable any unknown or always-on tunnel | Disable any remote pathway you cannot identify an owner and a business reason for; Route the highest-risk remaining pathway through a brokered jump host with strong authentication | Route remote access through a controlled jump host / DMZ; Require strong authentication (MFA) for all remote entry |
| IT-03 — Technical debt reduction | List systems already past end-of-support; Flag any that are internet-facing | Confirm no internet-facing system is running unsupported software; isolate anything that is; Disable the legacy protocols you can turn off without a project — SMBv1, TLS 1.0/1.1, basic authentication | Rank legacy systems by exposure and business impact; Isolate the worst offenders that cannot be retired yet |
| IT-06 — Risk-based vulnerability management | Confirm scanning covers internet-facing systems; Check for any known-exploited vulnerabilities already public | Run an authenticated scan across endpoints and servers and confirm it covered the full inventory; Check your estate against the known-exploited vulnerability catalogue and remediate those findings first | Run authenticated scans across endpoints and servers; Set remediation SLAs by severity |
| OT-05 — OT vulnerability management | Cross-reference the OT inventory against known-exploited and vendor advisories; Flag any internet-reachable OT device | Cross-reference the inventory against vendor advisories and the known-exploited catalogue, and rank by exposure and process impact; Apply compensating controls — isolation, access restriction — to the worst findings you cannot safely patch yet | Rank findings by exposure and process impact; Apply compensating controls (isolation, access limits) to the worst that cannot be patched now |
| IT-09 — Backup and disaster recovery | Confirm critical systems and CUI are actually being backed up; Verify at least one copy is offline or immutable | Perform one real test restore of a critical system and time it against what the business expects; Separate backup administration credentials from production administration and enforce MFA on them | Separate backup credentials from production admin accounts and add MFA; Define RTO/RPO for critical systems |
| OT-04 — OT incident response and recovery | Confirm whether any OT-specific response plan exists; List who to call for an OT incident, including engineers and vendors | Write the one-page version first: who to call, what may never be isolated without the process owner, and where the safe-state procedures are; Confirm backups of controller logic and configuration exist for your most critical line | Draft an OT IR plan with roles, contacts, and safe-state options; Confirm backups of controller logic/config exist |
| OT-08 — OT system resiliency | Confirm backups exist for controller logic and configurations; List critical single points of failure | Confirm that controller logic, configuration, and set points are backed up for your most critical line, and store a copy off the device; Write down the safe-state and manual-operation fallback with the operators who would use it | Define acceptable downtime for critical processes; Document safe-state and manual-operation fallbacks |
Validation and evidence
| Practice | First validation check | Evidence to retain | Where it will live |
|---|---|---|---|
| IT-01 | Attempt sign-in with password only on a test account — it must fail. | MFA policy with named owner and scope; Identity-policy export showing enforcement | |
| IT-02 | Pick ten devices from the network at random; all ten must appear in the inventory with an owner. | Inventory policy naming the owner, sources, and cadence; Inventory export covering hardware, software, cloud apps, and identities | |
| OT-01 | Pick a production device and confirm it no longer uses a default or vendor-set password. | OT access-control policy including vendor and break-glass procedures; Account inventory and privilege assignments per system | |
| OT-02 | Pick five random devices on the floor; all five must appear in the inventory. | Inventory ownership and update policy; Inventory export with firmware and connectivity fields | |
| IT-05 | From a standard user device, attempt to reach a server-zone or management interface — it must be blocked. | Network segmentation design and zone policy; Firewall/ACL rule exports enforcing inter-zone controls | |
| OT-03 | From a business-network host, attempt to reach an OT controller directly — it must be blocked. | OT segmentation architecture and zone/conduit policy; Boundary/DMZ and firewall rule exports enforcing default-deny | |
| OT-06 | Attempt to reach an OT device remotely without going through the jump host — it must fail. | Remote/vendor access policy with time-bound and emergency procedures; Jump-host/DMZ design and remote-access account settings | |
| IT-03 | Confirm no internet-facing system is running unsupported software. | Lifecycle/retirement policy and the funded roadmap; Evidence legacy protocols are disabled and systems are isolated | |
| IT-06 | Confirm the last authenticated scan actually covered the full asset inventory, not a subset. | Vulnerability management policy with severity SLAs; Scanner coverage/configuration showing authenticated scans | |
| OT-05 | Confirm every high-risk OT vulnerability has either an applied patch or a documented compensating control. | OT vulnerability/patch policy including compensating-control criteria; Vulnerability-to-asset mapping and applied compensating controls | |
| IT-09 | Perform an unannounced test restore of a critical system and time it against the RTO. | Backup and DR policy with RTO/RPO targets; Backup job configuration and immutability/offline settings | |
| OT-04 | Confirm the OT plan names specific people and reachable after-hours contacts, not just titles. | OT incident-response and recovery plan with roles and safe-state procedures; Inventory of controller logic/config backups used for recovery | |
| OT-08 | Test-restore a controller's logic/configuration and confirm the process resumes correctly. | OT resiliency/contingency plan with downtime targets and fallbacks; Controller backup inventory and redundancy/spares list |
Limitations
Nothing on this list should be actioned on a live operational-technology system without the process owner's agreement, an approved maintenance window, a tested rollback, and a safety review. Where a security action conflicts with safe operation, the safe operation wins and the control is compensated instead.
This is independent educational material. It supports planning and evidence collection; it does not establish compliance with NIST SP 800-171, DFARS 252.204-7012, CMMC, export-control obligations, or any contract requirement, and it is not an assessment. Tailor every item to your own technical, operational, contractual, regulatory, and safety requirements.
Printing produces a paginated document. Choose “Save as PDF” in the print dialog and name it batb-30-day-implementation-plan-template to keep filenames consistent across your team.